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ABSTRACT 
 
Individuals, groups and organizations are subject to multiple accountability pressures that are 
often overlooked in analyzing accountability relationships. The shortcomings of two schemata for 
classifying and depicting multiple accountability relationships are addressed to create an 
alternative matrix-based approach. This matrix blends criteria espoused by category theorists with 
Bergsteiner’s (2004) responsibility/accountability taxonomy. Although the proposed matrix is 
intended to generalize across accountability situations, its capacity to highlight one-way, mutual 
and self accountabilities of organizations and their many constituents in meeting their role/task, 
legal/ethical and moral responsibilities is demonstrated by focusing on accountability relationships 
affecting the operator of a privately operated hospital.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ne of the complexities in accountability theory is dealing with situations where people are accountable to 
more than one party, referred to as having multiple constituencies (Carnevale, 1985; Ferris, Mitchell, 
Canavan, Frink, & Hopper 1995; Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Leslie, Aring, & Brand 
1998; Shearer, 2002; Tsui, 1990). Clearly, most situations at home, work, or play (for example in competitive team 
sports) can give rise to multiple accountability relationships. In practice, accountability relationships can be very 
complex, particularly in large organizations.  
 
At times different accountability relationships reflect conflicting interests, which has led some writers to 
conclude that the presumed diversity of goals of different constituencies makes it impossible for organizations to 
satisfy multiple constituencies simultaneously (e.g. Tsui, 1990). Other writers are more optimistic, arguing that by 
bringing the visions and goals of various parties into alignment, the interests of different constituencies can be 
satisfied (Avery, 2004; Leslie et al., 1998; Shearer, 2002). In order to achieve this goal alignment – or to recognize the 
interests among multiple constituencies that are not being satisfied – it is necessary to identify the affected parties and 
the nature of their accountability relationships. Despite the prevalence of multiple constituencies in accountability 
relationships, satisfactory ways of depicting and classifying relationships involving numerous parties have not been 
developed.  
 
In this paper, we examine two existing schemata for classifying complex organizational accountability 
relationships, using criteria established by categorization theorists to identify some of their shortcomings. We then 
propose an Accountability Relationships Matrix to overcome the problems identified in the published schemata. A 
practical example of a hospital operator, for whom multiple accountability relationships arise, is used to demonstrate 
the utility of the Accountability Relationships Matrix. 
 
EXTANT SCHEMATA 
 
Romzek and Ingraham (2000) propose a matrix and a schema to depict the complexity of multiple 
accountability relationships in public organizations. Their two-by-two “types of accountability relationships” matrix 
aims to depict four kinds of accountability relationships thought to characterize U.S. public organizations – 
hierarchical, legal, professional, and political. Each of the four accountability relationships in turn is classified 
O 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – March 2006                                                          Volume 4, Number 3 
 2 
according to whether the source of the accountability pressure is internal or external, and whether the degree of 
autonomy associated with a particular form of accountability is low or high. 
 
Koppell (2005, p. 95) has suggested that “this approach seems to mix together types of accountability that are 
substantively different”. Indeed, Romzek and Ingraham‟s (2000) matrix is comprised of a mix of elements that does 
not meet categorization criteria proposed by category theorists such as Britt (1997), Feigl (1988), Howard (1999), 
Klein (1999), or Rosch (1978). These theorists argue that members of a category should be one or more of the 
following: be organized into hierarchies of relative complexity, be subunits of a basic unit, form part of a structure or 
taxonomy, share common salient attributes, have category resemblance, or provide functional comparability. The four 
elements of Romzek and Ingraham‟s matrix do not meet this test because they variously describe a relationship 
typology (e.g. hierarchical, flat, networked, organic), prescriptions format (e.g. legal, moral, ethical, normative), skill 
level (e.g. professional, semi-professional, skilled, unskilled), and decision environment (e.g. political, philosophical, 
scientific, chance). Thus, each of their matrix elements could itself form the basis of a matrix. 
 
The following example demonstrates the categorization quandary the Romzek and Ingraham (2000) matrix 
can pose in relation to specific situations. Legal professionals in, say, a politically tainted and hierarchically organized 
Attorney General‟s Department, theoretically fit any one of the four cells of the matrix (hierarchical, legal, 
professional, political). Similarly, doctors are clearly professionals, but they often work in hierarchically organized 
health systems such as hospitals. Romzek and Johnston (2005), in a more recent paper, appear to recognize this 
weakness when they write, “The stability offered by traditional hierarchical models of governance is lacking in the 
network systems that are increasingly being used to deliver social services” (p. 440). However, conceptually the 
Romzek and Ingraham (2000) matrix is limited to hierarchical accountabilities. Nor are any of the other potentially 
important accountabilities identified above, for example, nonprofessional and moral accountabilities, taken into 
consideration by either the matrix or the schema. As the hospitals case below shows, in order to be able to establish 
whether accountability relationships are working, one needs first to acknowledge that an accountability relationship 
exists and know the nature of that relationship.   
 
The classificatory problems identified above may also account for problems at the contents level of the 
matrix. The four cells of Romzek and Ingraham‟s (2000) two-by-two matrix, which are stated to depict four kinds of 
accountability relationships, arguably do not represent relationships at all, but two equations and two unfeasible 
conditions.  
 
In essence, Romzek and Ingraham‟s (2000) matrix advances the following four propositions with regard to 
the four types of accountability relationships: 
 
1. Professional accountability relationship proposition: sources of expectations and/or control are internal, 
degree of autonomy is high.  Since a person whose source of expectations is internal and who exercises 
internal control, by definition, would tend to have high autonomy, this proposition does not depict a 
relationship, but an equation, namely: internal control/expectations = high autonomy. 
 
2. Hierarchical accountability relationship proposition: sources of expectations and/or control are internal, 
degree of autonomy is low. 
 
If the equation in 1. above holds (internal control/expectations = high autonomy), then the statement “internal 
control/expectations = low autonomy”, as projected by the hierarchical, proposition cannot be true, that is: internal 
control/expectations ≠  low autonomy. 
 
The hierarchical proposition therefore represents a logically impossible condition. Applying this to 
hierarchical, institutional settings, such as a hospital, employees lower down the hierarchy (e.g. nurses), by virtue of 
the hierarchical relationship, are subject to others‟ (e.g. managements‟) will and expectations (= external source). At 
each level of a hierarchy, the expectations and control reside in the next higher, and hence external, level. This 
example describes employees with low autonomy who are subject to external control/expectations. Note therefore that 
people can be subject to external expectations that have their source both within and outside the organization. For 
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example, nurses and doctors may be subject to the requirements of their unions, professional associations, registration 
bodies, any public health authorities, and so on. Bovens (1998) sees the external control that characterizes hierarchical 
organizations as an institutionalized problem, where accountability demands may be satisfied through nothing more 
than compliance with a policy or a request from someone higher up the line. 
 
3. Legal accountability relationship proposition: sources of expectations and/or control are external, degree of 
autonomy is low.  A person whose source of expectations is external and who is subject to external control, 
by definition, would tend to have low autonomy, therefore this proposition also does not depict a 
relationship, but an equation, namely: external control/expectations = low autonomy. 
 
4. Political accountability relationship proposition: sources of expectations and/or control are external, degree 
of autonomy is high.  If the equation in 3. above holds (external control/expectations = low autonomy), then 
the statement “external control/expectations = high autonomy‟, as projected by the political proposition 
cannot be true, that is: external control/expectations ≠  high autonomy. 
 
Propositions 2 and 4 therefore represent logically inadmissible conditions. The matrix therefore fails in both 
its logic and in its classificatory approach. 
 
In a separate schema, which builds on the matrix, Romzek and Ingraham (2000) propose an underlying 
“value emphasis” for the four kinds of accountability relationships (efficiency, rule of law, expertise, responsiveness), 
and the key “behavioral expectation” that is associated with each type of accountability relationship. In this schema 
the authors propose that the behavioral expectation associated with the hierarchical type of accountability is 
“obedience to organizational directives”. This suggests a uni-directional accountability relationship. However, even in 
hierarchical organizations accountability works, or at least should work, in both directions (Bergsteiner, 2004; Frink & 
Klimoski, 1998). Thus, hierarchy, per se, is not a useful differentiator for different types of accountability. The 
suggestion in the schema that the value emphasis of hierarchical structures is efficiency can also be challenged. More 
probably the value emphasis of hierarchical accountability is control and simplicity. While hierarchical structures have 
a certain simplicity when compared with matrix or networked structures (Mintzberg, 1993), whether this simplicity 
translates into efficiency depends on other variables, including the nature of the task. For example, a hierarchical 
structure may not be the most efficient for highly qualified, self-optimizing medical researchers since the kind of 
control that hierarchical structures tend to entail is not conducive to innovation, a certain degree of risk-taking, and 
organizational learning (Dose & Klimoski, 1995; Gouldner, 1954; Müller & Hurter, 1999).  
 
The Romzek and Ingraham matrix and its associated schema therefore appear flawed in a number of respects: 
firstly in terms of their classificatory approach, and secondly in terms of some of the detailed implied argument. 
  
Glynn and Perkins (1998) have proposed a second schema for classifying accountability relationships, which 
begins to reveal the wide range of accountabilities in a hospital system. In a comparative study of NSW and UK 
hospital systems, Glynn and Perkins identified six broad areas of accountability relationships: 
 
1. professional disciplinary/occupational accountabilities  
2. managerial accountabilities 
3. inter-departmental accountabilities 
4. purchaser accountabilities 
5. financial/fiscal accountabilities 
6. public/consumer accountabilities. 
 
However, this list also raises similar issues to the Romzek and Ingraham tables. Even though it covers some 
important accountability categories, the Glynn and Perkins list is incomplete. Some missing accountability 
relationships for hospitals include supplier accountabilities, social and environmental accountabilities, non-
professional/non-managerial accountabilities, intra-departmental accountabilities, corporate governance 
accountabilities, among others. Contrary to good category theory, the Glynn and Perkins model also mixes up 
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category types such as entities (e.g. managerial accountability) with structural issues (e.g. interdepartmental 
accountability.)  
 
In the specific case of a hospital operator trying to meet his/her role/task obligations in an organizational 
setting, the hospital director (representing the entity) will have a direct accountability relationship with a number of 
parties. These parties include doctors, nurses, patients, and the relevant government department(s), among others. 
Those parties themselves will have accountability relationships with each other (e.g. doctors and nurses, nurses and 
patients), that will impact indirectly on the ability of the accountee (the director) to meet role/task, legal/ethical and 
moral obligations. In this paper, we use the term „accountor‟ to refer to the party that holds another party, the 
„accountee‟, to account.  
 
Therefore, while Romzek and Ingraham‟s chart and Glynn and Perkins‟ list go some way towards 
demonstrating the concept of multiple constituencies, as classification systems they lack completeness, structure and 
clarity (Britt, 1997; Feigl, 1988; Howard, 1999; Klein, 1999; Rosch, 1978). Given that people operating within a 
hierarchical, legal, professional, political, non-professional, financial/fiscal, artistic, ethical, managerial, procedural, 
familial, religious, or environmental context (the eclectic nature of this list is deliberate) are all subject to various 
degrees of role/task, legal/ethical and moral responsibility (Bergsteiner, 2004), it may be more instructive to look at 
accountability relationships through a conceptually less eclectic, framework that can be applied more generically. A 
framework incorporating these concepts is developed in the next section.  
 
ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONSHIPS MATRIX 
 
Trying to quantify the multiplicity of mutual accountability relationships that need to be managed in an 
organization so that any one accountee or group of accountees can meet his/her/their obligations is challenging. The 
Accountability Relationships Matrix shown in Figure 1 adopts the responsibility/accountability concepts framework 
proposed by Bergsteiner and Avery (2003) to depict the multiplicity of accountability relationships potentially 
impacting on a privately run institution such as a hospital, prison, detention centre, nursing home or private school that 
is accountable to a government authority. Note that in the example presented here, the accountability focus is on the 
performance of the enterprise/institution, in this case a private hospital.  
 
Concepts included in the matrix are defined elsewhere in detail (Bergsteiner, 2004; Bergsteiner & Avery, 
2003). However, role/task responsibility is essentially defined as a product of social roles that one acquires or chooses 
to accept, implying duties and obligations arising from the proper performance of the role and from group 
membership. Role/task responsibility, and concomitant accountability, is usually understood to be attached to 
particular tasks assigned to, or carried out by, people. Ethical/legal and moral responsibility derive from the 
requirement to make behavior, decisions and choices subject to legal, ethical and moral rules of conduct. Self-
accountability refers to behavior applied to the self, and involves self-evaluation of behavior and its consequence, and 
making voluntary changes to behavior (Dose & Klimoski, 1995). Individuals may seek or self-administer rewards, 
sanctions or feedback based on progress towards goal attainment. 
 
Entities at the left and the top of the matrix may play an accountor and/or accountee role with respect to the 
privately run institution. On the left, the entities are shown in their role as potential accountees; at the top, they are 
shown in their role as potential accountors. The various cells show whether there is a potential accountability 
relationship at all, whether this relationship is a mutual one or uni-directional, and the kind of obligations that 
relationship is based upon (role/task, legal/ethical and/or moral responsibility). Row 7 of Figure 1 indicates to whom 
the enterprise is accountable, and column G shows who is accountable to the enterprise. 
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Figure 1:  Accountability Relationships Matrix For A Private Hospital 
 
Light grey cells = mutual accountability relationship                                “R” = role/task responsibility 
Dark grey cells = uni-directional accountability relationship                    “L” = legal/ethical responsibility 
Cells with an “S” = self-accountability                                                      “M” = moral responsibility 
Blank cells = absence of any accountability relationship 
 
 
Figure 1 highlights seven different kinds of accountability relationships that impinge on the operator‟s ability 
to properly carry out his task: mutual accountability relationships (light grey cells) based on one or more of role/task, 
legal/ethical and moral responsibility; uni-directional accountability relationships (dark grey cells) based on one or 
more of role/task, legal/ethical and moral responsibility; and self-accountability (white cells with an “S”). 
 
The test of whether an entity should appear on this matrix or not is whether, with respect to the enterprises‟ 
operation, an entity has an obligation to the enterprise, or whether the enterprise has an obligation to the entity, that 
could give rise to an accountability demand. In the absence of any such obligations, accountability demands cannot 
arise (Bergsteiner, 2004). For example, in the case of a hospital operator, should the referring physicians appear on the 
matrix? If the referring physicians have no obligations to the private hospital operator regarding the running of the 
hospital, and since the hospital operator would normally have no obligations to the referring physicians as regards the 
running of the hospital, the referring physicians have no place on the matrix. On the other hand, the Health 
Department (the responsible government authority) has role/task and legal/ethical obligations to the relevant 
government minister to ensure that it establishes a legal and administrative framework for the operator that will allow 
© Harald Bergsteiner 2004 
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ACCOUNTEES   
1 Nation (society) S              
2 Government (elected rep's) RLM S RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM M  RLM M  
3 Premier (or Prime Minister) RLM RLM S RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM M  RLM M  
4 Minister RLM RLM RLM S RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM M  RLM M  
5 
Gov. dept., (e.g. Health 
Department) 
RLM RLM RLM RLM S RLM RLM RLM RLM M  RLM M  
6 Professional/trade associations RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM S RLM RLM       RLM  
7 Enterprise (mgnt & staff) M RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM S RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM  
8 Suppliers M RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM RLM S RLM  RLM RLM    
9 Enterprise Board of Management M RLM RLM RLM RLM LM LM RLM S RLM RLM  LM RLM  
10 Enterprise shareholders M      LM   LM S LM   M  
11 Creditors M       RLM RML RLM RML S    
12 Customers (e.g. patients) M      LM LM    S  M 
13 Union (enterprise workers) M     RLM RLM   RLM    S  
14 „Watchdogs‟, lobby groups M           M  S 
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him to properly carry out his responsibilities. Similarly, the Minister has obligations to the Health Department (e.g. to 
ensure that it is appropriately funded and supported). On the matrix, the two parties therefore appear as having mutual 
obligations with regard to the hospital‟s ability to carry out its obligations.   
 
From Figure 1, it is evident that virtually any given situation can be depicted as a matrix of potential 
accountability relationships. Only those entities should be included on the matrix that are or may be in an 
accountability relationship with the party under examination. Thus, in Figure 1 the focus is on the “enterprise 
(management & staff)”. If the focus were on, say, the “government department”, the content of the matrix would be 
somewhat different, since the government department would, under normal circumstances, not have an accountability 
relationship with, say, the creditors of the enterprise. On the other hand, the government department may have 
accountability relationships with other government departments or groups that impact on its ability to perform its 
function vis-à-vis the hospital enterprise. Thus, a matrix with different content needs to be generated for whichever 
entity is specifically being focused on.  
 
Generating such a matrix for any accountee or group of accountees within a particular context is quite 
straightforward, by: 
 
1. determining who the accountee is for a particular role/task; 
2. listing all the actors who could be involved in an accountability relationship with that accountee in meeting 
his/her role/task obligations; 
3. arranging the list of actors in a relevant sequence, e.g. in order of hierarchy if appropriate; 
4. juxtaposing the two lists of actors/entities vis-à-vis each other in a matrix format;  
5. highlighting pairings of actors at the intersection of matrix cells that may have an accountability relationship 
that impinges, either directly or indirectly, on the accountee‟s ability to properly perform his/her task; and  
6. indicating the nature of the relationship, i.e. whether it is mutual or uni-directional, and which kinds of 
responsibility it is based on. 
 
The proposed Accountability Relationships Matrix serves only to indicate broadly the large number of 
different types of accountability obligations and demands that can arise in any one situation. The accountability 
implications of each cell can generate considerable discussion and research. Certainly some of the accountability 
obligations and demands will be ongoing and immediate, whereas others will be more peripheral. For example, a 
hospital operator will have a direct, mutual and high-level accountability relationship with the relevant government 
department – the operator is required to fulfil his contractual obligations, and the government department is obliged to 
set up an operational framework that will enable the operator to properly discharge his responsibilities. Likewise, 
hospital patients stand in a mutual accountability relationship with the enterprise – the hospital is accountable for the 
quality of its care, but the patient has a legal and moral obligation to pay.  
 
On the other hand, not all entrants in the matrix will have accountabilities to others. For example, societies 
tend not to owe others any explanations and are only rarely held accountable. Although every entity is responsible to 
society in one way or another, it is difficult to hold whole societies accountable except through such institutions as the 
United Nations or the International Court of Justice.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The generic Accountability Relationships Matrix proposed in this paper provides a template for highlighting 
the mutual, one-way and self accountabilities of organizations and their constituents in meeting their role/task, 
legal/ethical and moral responsibilities. The matrix overcomes problems identified in existing schemata for identifying 
multiple constituencies in accountability relationships. First, the matrix can be expanded to ensure completeness of the 
parties represented, just as it can be further refined internally. For a more fine-grained analysis, individual parameters 
such as the “enterprise” can be broken down into more discrete parts such as CEO, middle management or chief 
nurses. In terms of category theory, the parameters in the Accountability Relationships Matrix all represent 
entities/actors, and the cells all refer to responsibilities and obligations that these entities/actors hold with respect to 
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each other. Thus, the template also fulfils category theorists‟ call for common salient attributes, category resemblance, 
and functional comparability. 
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